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 Abstract 
 　 Modern linguistics has been heavily influenced by the theories of Noam Chomsky, which fit 
within the philosophical tradition of idealism or rationalism; namely, that as a biological endow-
ment language is a property of the mind, the product of Universal Grammar, and essentially for 
thought.  This is in contrast to the materialist or empiricist position that language is a social phe-
nomenon, primarily for communication.  In recent years, the question of the evolution of the lan-
guage faculty has received much attention.  For Chomskyans, the language faculty is a recent 
evolutionary development that emerged suddenly as the result of a minor mutation.  For materi-
alists/empiricists, it evolved gradually through natural selection, as a product of culture and the 
need to make communication more efficient. 
 Key words : language faculty, Chomskyan idealism/rationalism, biolinguistic, I-language, natural 
selection 
 　 In a well-known textbook on language and linguistics, Fromkin et al. (2011) maintain that “a 
number of facts pertaining to all languages can be stated” (p. 34).  Among these is that “the 
ability of human beings to acquire, know, and use language is a biologically based ability rooted 
in the structure of the human brain, and expressed in different modalities (spoken or signed)” (p. 
35).  Although this is a generally accepted fact about language, it is subject to finely nuanced 
interpretations that can lead to very different conclusions about the nature of language and its 
origin. 
 　 The idea that the human language faculty is biologically based and rooted in the structure of 
the human brain is a well-known aspect of Noam Chomsky’s theory of language. Chomsky refers 
to “substantial progress” in the study of language since the 1950s that “(often implicitly) takes 
for granted some version of the thesis on mind/brain” that “‘things mental, indeed minds, are 
emergent properties of brains’” (2000, p. 1). 
〈原著論文〉
人文学部・欧米文化学科 論文受理日 2016 年 6 月 30 日
― 72 ―
聖学院大学論叢　第 29 巻　第 1 号　2016 年
 　 For 60 years―since the 1956 publication of “Three Models for the Description of Language,” 
followed by his seminal work on generative grammar,  Syntactic Structures , in 1957 and his 
review of B.  F. Skinner’s  Verbal Behavior in 1959 that helped shift linguistics away from 
behaviorism, and continuing to the present (Berwick ＆ Chomsky, 2016; Chomsky, 2016) ―
Chomsky and his ideas about the nature as well as the origin of the human language faculty 
have influenced generations of linguists.  At the same time that his ideas have attracted a 
devoted following, they have also generated vehement criticism.  As the criticism has become 
more vociferous, there has been a “gradual decline of the Chomskian paradigm as a unifying 
framework” in language studies (Dor et al., 2014, p. 1), leading to more fragmentation among 
theorists of the origin and nature of the human language faculty.  This paper will examine the 
Chomskyan and anti-Chomskyan positions on this subject in an attempt to clarify some of the 
major differences in thinking about this important issue. 
 1.  Formal and Functional Linguistics: Idealism/Rationalism vs. 
Materialism/Empiricism 
 　 Labov (1987) points out that although linguistics is “a relatively unified field of study, 
compared to many others,” there is “a profound division in the foundations of our discipline, that 
corresponds quite closely to the traditional philosophical opposition of idealism and materialism.” 
He further notes that these two approaches “differ sharply in their approaches to the foundations 
of the field: definition of language itself, the methods for gathering data and analyzing it, and the 
goals of linguistic activity” (“1. Fundamental agreements and disagreements in linguistics”). 
Labov explains these contrasting definitions of language as follows: 
 The idealist conception is that language is a property of the individual, a species-specific and 
genetically inherited capacity to form rules of a particular type, relatively isolated from 
other activities of the human intelligence.  The materialistic conception is that language is a 
property of the speech community, an instrument of social communication that evolves 
gradually and continuously throughout human history, in response to a variety of human 
needs and activities. (“2. The definition of the field”) 
 　 The idealist conception, also referred to as rationalism, corresponds to the emphasis formal 
linguistics places on language as a biological endowment, while the materialistic conception, also 
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known as empiricism, corresponds to the emphasis functional linguistics places on language as 
communication and as a social phenomenon (Everaert and Huybregts, 2013, p. 20). 
 1.1  Chomskyan Linguistics: Universals and the Interface between Language and Thought 
 　 Chomsky’s ideas reflect the idealist/rationalist approach and are most closely associated with 
generative linguistics.  While the core of his approach to language may be thought of as 
syntactic theory, Chomsky’s approach encompasses more than syntactic theory per se.  For 
Chomsky, syntactic theory leads to the philosophical question of what language is, which as he 
has recently stated (Chomsky, 2016, p. 2), has not been clearly answered despite 2,500 years of 
intensive and productive study. 
 　 The question of what language is then leads to the question of how the faculty of human 
language evolved.  Chomsky refers to his approach as “biolinguistic” and as attempting to 
“unearth” the nature and properties of “linguistic states” and “their basis in innate biological 
endowment,” which “appears to determine a ‘faculty of language’ that is a distinctive component 
of higher mental faculties” shared among humans.  This conception of human language as a 
“particular object of the biological world” (Berwick ＆ Chomsky, 2016, p. 53) has come to be 
known as the biolinguistic perspective (p. 53) or the biolinguistic program (p. 90).  Further, 
Chomsky argues that “the faculty of language is a very recent evolutionary development and, as 
far as is known, is biologically isolated in crucial respects” (2000, p. 2).  Berwick and Chomsky 
(2016) have further argued, “The simplest assumption ... is that the generative procedure 
emerged suddenly as the result of a minor mutation” (p. 70).  These are some of the key 
differences between the Chomskyan approach, which has been called the “emergence” view 
(Everaert and Huybregts, 2013, p. 20), and that of his critics.  In short, the disagreement centers 
on whether the human language faculty could have emerged through a sudden and “radical 
phenotypic change,” as Chomsky argues, or through a series of small changes involving natural 
selection, as a number of his critics argue. 
 　 However, before going into more detail on this important disagreement, it may be helpful to 
consider how Chomsky’s ideas have changed over the past 60 years.  As stated above, 
Chomskyan syntactic theory leads invariably to the question of what language is, which then 
leads to the question of language evolution.  As Chomsky has dealt more and more with the 
question of the evolution of the human capacity for language 1 , his formulation of syntactic 
structure has undergone progressive simplification.  From the complex rules of transformational-
generative grammar in the earliest formulation of Chomsky’s syntactic theory to attempts to 
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account for crosslinguistic variation with Universal Grammar (UG) and the Principles and 
Parameters model, there was an effort in the 1990s to simplify UG so as to “formulate an ideal 
case and ask how closely language approximates the ideal, then seeking to overcome the many 
apparent discrepancies” (Berwick ＆ Chomsky, 2016, p. 94), and this became known as the 
Minimalist Program.  The Strong Minimalist Thesis (SMT) is that “UG reduces to the simplest 
computational principles 2 , which operate in accord with conditions of computational efficiency” (p. 
94).  Emphasizing the continuity of his theory despite its many modifications, Berwick and 
Chomsky call the Minimalist Program “a seamless continuation of the study of generative 
grammar from its origins” (p. 94). 
 　 Perhaps Chomsky’s central insight about language, and one of the most controversial, is that 
language is “essentially an instrument of thought” (2016, p. 16).  Berwick and Chomsky (2011) go 
so far as to dismiss the conventional view of language as “a system whose function is 
communication.”  They argue that “any aspect of what we do: style of dress, gesture, and so on” 
(p. 25) can also be used for communication, not only language.  Instead, they argue that 
“statistically speaking ... the overwhelming use of language is internal―for thought” (pp. 25 ― 26). 
They bolster their argument by quoting the neurologist Harry Jerison, who in 1973 wrote that 
“‘language did not evolve as a communication system ... the initial evolution of language is more 
likely to have been ... for the construction of a real world’, as a ‘tool for thought’” (p. 26). 
Furthermore, Berwick and Chomsky (2016, p. 102) claim that this is, indeed, “the traditional 
view” of language, citing the fact that “nineteenth-century Indo-Europeanists did often consider 
language in internalist terms, as a biological property of an individual” (p. 94).  Berwick and 
Chomsky state unequivocally that “... if language is not regarded [as an internal biological object], 
its evolution cannot be seriously discussed” (p. 94).  They caution that “any approach to the 
‘evolution of language’ that focuses on communication, or the sensorimotor system, or statistical 
properties of spoken language and the like, may be seriously misguided” (p. 84). 
 　 In an influential paper, Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002) point out that “many acrimonious 
debates” in the field of language evolution have been the result of failing to distinguish between 
“questions concerning language as a communicative system and questions concerning the 
computations underlying this system, such as those underlying recursion 3 .”  They further argue 
that questions concerning communication are aimed at “the interface between abstract 
computation and both sensory-motor and conceptual-intentional interfaces” (p. 1569).  Abstract 
computation is termed “faculty of language―narrow sense (FLN)” and is “independent of the 
other systems with which it interacts and interfaces” (p. 1570).  It equates to the syntax “that 
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generates internal representations and maps them into the sensory-motor interface by the 
phonological system, and into the conceptual-intentional interface by the (formal) semantic 
system” (p. 1571).  In other words, because of the FLN, we are able to produce “a potentially 
infinite array of discrete expressions,” which are then processed and vocalized or signed by the 
sensory-motor and conceptual-intentional sytems.  These sensory-motor and conceptual-
intentional interfaces are “organism-internal” and are termed “faculty of language―broad sense 
(FLB)” (p. 1571), which also includes the abstract computation of FLN.  In this conception of 
language, communication is the product of the FLB but is not at the heart of what language is. 
 　 This is essentially the same as Chomsky’s conception of language that places internal or 
“I-language” at its core.  This is the heart of Chomsky’s original formulation of generative 
grammar and its latest instantiation, the minimalist program, in which I-language is defined as “a 
computational system that generates infinitely many hierarchically structured internal 
expressions” (p. 52).  In fact, Chomsky describes I-language as the meaning of the term 
“language” (2010, p. 45) reflecting the Chomskyan view that I-language, “the internal language of 
thought” (Corballis, 2011, p. 23), is what  language means, not E-language, the external form of 
language (spoken or signed) that we actually use for communicative purposes.  Thus, what 
Chomsky is interested in is uncovering the internal processes involved in the human linguistic 
capacity―language universals―not their external manifestations; ie., language used for 
communication.  Thus, “language evolved for thought and interpretation: it is fundamentally a 
system of meaning ....  Language is meaning with sound (or some other externalization, or none)” 
(Berwick ＆ Chomsky, 2016, p. 101). 
 　 Chomskyan syntactic theory has led to the insight that one of the key properties of the 
syntactic structure of human language is that it is hierarchical and “is blind to considerations of 
linear order, with linear ordering constraints reserved for externalization” (Berwick ＆ Chomsky, 
2016, p 8).  For example, in the sentence  Instinctively birds that fly swim ,  instinctively  modifies 
 swim , not  fly , although it is closer to  fly in terms of linear order.  As Berwick ＆ Chomsky 
explain, “ Instinctively is associated with  swim because it is closer to  swim in terms of structural 
distance:  swim is embedded one level down from  instinctively , but  fly is embedded two levels 
down from  instinctively ” (p. 117).  Therefore, what matters in human syntax is not linear distance 
(external, E-language) but structural distance (internal, I-language). 
 　 The simplification of Chomskyan syntactic theory in the Minimalist Program crucially 
involves the key concept Merge.  According to Berwick and Chomsky (2016), “In the best case, 
there remains a single operation for building the hierarchical structure required for human 
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language syntax, Merge.  This operation takes any two syntactic elements and combines them 
into a new, larger hierarchically structured expression” (p 10).  For example, Merge takes any 
two syntactic objects  X and  Y that are already formed (for example,  read and  books ) and makes 
a new syntactic object  Z from them without changing the original syntactic objects ( read books ). 
“In particular, it will leave them unordered ...  Merge is therefore just set formation: Merge of  X 
and  Y yields the set [ X ,  Y ]” (p. 98).  It “can then apply recursively to this new hierarchically 
structured syntactic object, yielding, for example  the guy read books .  In this way Merge 
recursively builds an infinite array of hierarchically structured representations” (p. 112). 
 2.  Criticisms of the Chomskyan Approach 
 　 The materialist/empiricist approach minimizes universals and emphasizes the social and 
cultural dimensions of language―language used for communication.  For example, Corballis 
(2011, p. 33) asserts that “language does not appear fully formed in different cultures as a 
product of universal grammar, but comes about gradually as a product of culture and 
accumulated experience, and a practical concern to make communication more efficient.”  He 
continues: “It remains something of an open question just how much of language depends on 
innate components specific to language itself, and how much on more general aspects of the 
human mind.”  His understanding of universals is that “any universal principles underlying 
language can be regarded as principles of human thought, and not specific to language” (p, 34). 
Thus, unlike Chomsky, Corballis separates thought and language per se. 
 　 Dor et al. (2014) are critical of the influence Chomsky’s claim for the “human genetic 
endowment for language” had on the direction of the field, such that the role “social dynamics 
must have played ... in the evolutionary process ... was taken to be secondary, peripheral to the 
drama of the genes.”  They argue that “much evidence from different disciplines ... has 
accumulated to show that changes in society and culture must have played a central role in the 
entire process” and that “the gene-centred approach to language’s evolutionary emergence relies 
on an outdated conception of evolution 4 ” because “current research in evolutionary biology 
highlights the fact that major changes in behaviour and cognition can take place without any 
changes in the genes ....  This understanding opens up the possibility that linguistic capacities 
may have preceded genetic accommodation for language” (p. 2). 
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 2.1  Criticisms of I-language and Universal Grammar 
 　 Corballis (2011, pp. 24 ― 25) reviews Chomsky’s view of language and concludes that I-language 
is the basis of his concept of Universal Grammar.  Corballis argues that criticisms of Universal 
Grammar “challenge the view that the universal principles of language can be derived from a 
single language” and that “the sheer variety of human languages may threaten the view that 
I-language can be said to exist in anything like the form proposed by Chomsky.” Critics of 
Chomsky’s I-language and Universal Grammar point out, for instance, the possibility that even 
some syntactic categories, particularly the distinction between noun and verb, may not be 
present in all languages. 
 　 While perhaps not speaking directly to Corballis’ claim, Berwick and Chomsky (2016) contend 
that it is E-language that changes and produces the great variety of human languages.  They 
argue that confusion could be overcome “by replacing the metaphorical notions ‘evolution of 
language’ and ‘language change’ by their more exact counterparts: evolution of the organisms 
that use language, and change in the ways they do so.”  Thus, “emergence of the language 
faculty involved evolution, while historical change (which continues constantly) does not” (p. 83). 
 　 On the other hand, Corballis (2011) questions whether the linguistic diversity we see could 
have arisen in as short a time as the Chomskyans claim.  He concludes: “What seems more likely 
is that grammar itself evolved gradually rather than as a singular event within the past 100,000 
years” (p. 29). 
 　 Corballis and others in the materialist/empiricist camp consider E-language―the role of 
communication―to be more fundamental than I-language in driving language evolution: 
 The story that is beginning to emerge ... is that language does not appear fully formed in 
different cultures as a product of universal grammar, but comes about gradually as a 
product of culture and accumulated experience, and a practical concern to make 
communication more efficient. (p. 33) 
 　 Dor et al. (2014) likewise approach the issue from a materialist/rationalist perspective and 
differ from Chomsky “ in insisting that language ... presupposes engagement with other minds. 
To be ‘language-ready’ ..., the brain must be social to an unusual degree; and for the human 
brain to be that social, human society must have gone through an unusual evolutionary 
dynamic” (p. 3).  Dor and Jablonka (2014) differ from Chomsky in arguing “we are born with 
minds that evolved  for language” rather than “we have innate knowledge of language” (p. 28). 
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This is a subtle difference but key to the materialist/rationalist position. 
 3.  Language Evolution: “Miraculous” Event or a Product of Natural Selection? 
 　 As we have seen, Chomsky argues that the study of language since the 1950s has taken for 
granted that minds are emergent properties of brains.  He argues that this thesis 
 revives eighteenth-century proposals ... in particular, the conclusion that Newton appeared 
to have established, to his considerable dismay, that ‘a purely materialistic or mechanistic 
physics’ is ‘impossible’; and the implications of ‘Locke’s suggestion’ that God might have 
chosen to ‘superadd to matter  a faculty of thinking [italics in original]’ just as he ‘annexed 
effects to motion which we can in no way conceive motion able to produce’. (2000, p. 1) 
 　 Thus, the question of the nature of the human language capacity becomes intertwined with 
the question of how humans acquired language in the first place.  In claiming that his ideas are 
in the physical and philosophical tradition of Newton and Locke, Chomsky here and in other 
places (Chomsky, 2016; Berwick ＆ Chomsky, 2016) acknowledges the important role of mystery 
in the universe while never explicitly endorsing the theological stance taken by Newton and 
Locke: 
 Inquiry reveals as well, I think, that the reach of human thought is itself bounded by the 
‘limits on admissible hypotheses’ that yield its richness and depth, leaving mysteries that 
will resist the kind of understanding to which creators of the early modern scientific 
revolution aspired, as was recognized in various ways by the great figures of seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century thought. (Chomsky, 2016, p. 59) 
 　 Thus, Chomsky (2010) is able to argue the following: “... we can suggest what seems to be the 
simplest speculation about the evolution of language”; namely, “within some small group from 
which we are all descended, a rewiring of the brain took place in some individual, call him 
 Prometheus ” (p. 59).  Chomsky goes on to claim “Prometheus had many advantages: capacities 
for complex thought ... and so on.  The capacity would then be transmitted to offspring, coming 
to predominate,” although he acknowledges that this transmission to offspring is “no trivial 
matter, it appears, but let us put that aside” (p. 59). 
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 　 Corballis (2011) is among those who are highly critical of Chomsky’s stance on the evolution 
of the language faculty.  He asserts that Chomsky’s claim, with its reference to the Greek deity 
Prometheus, “smacks of the miraculous” (p. 24), and elsewhere implicitly links Chomsky’s view of 
language to the nineteenth century view that “language was a gift from God” since it “also leads 
to a somewhat miraculous view of how language evolved” (p. 55).  Chomsky’s counterargument 
might be that Corballis is confusing miracle and mystery. 
 　 Similarly, Diller and Cann (2013) accuse Chomsky and his followers of ignorance―indeed, 
“magical thinking”―about genetics.  They mince no words: “To clear the way for a biological 
perspective on the evolution of language, the Chomskian approach to Universal Grammar must 
be rejected.  Universal Grammar is not what is innate for language” (p. 246).  They contend, 
“Universal Grammar requires magical thinking about genes and genetics” (p. 244).  Indeed, “from 
a biological point of view, one sees a surprising amount of magical thinking among linguists and 
palaeoanthropologists, ...  couched in the vocabulary of genes and genetics” (p. 245). 
 　 Chomsky does, in fact, use the vocabulary of genetics when he refers to the event that he 
claims led to the evolution of the language faculty as a “mutation” (2010, p. 59, 61), “some genetic 
event [that] rewired the brain, providing the mechanisms for language” (p. 58).  He references 
the paleoanthropologist Ian Tattersall (1998) in support of this claim: 
 ‘... something occurred that set the stage for language acquisition ... a chance combination of 
preexisting elements result[ed] in something totally unexpected’ presumably ‘a neural 
change ... in some population of the human lineage ... rather minor in genetic terms, [which] 
probably had nothing whatever to do with adaptation ...  We have to conclude that the 
appearance of language and its anatomical correlates was not driven by natural selection ...’ 
Perhaps it was a side effect of increased brain size ... or perhaps some chance mutation. (p. 
59). 
 　 Concerning the latter speculation, Berwick and Chomsky (2011) confidently assert: “It appears 
that human brain size reached its current level recently, perhaps about 100,000 years ago, which 
suggests to some specialists [Georg Striedter, 2004] that ‘human language probably evolved at 
least in part, as an automatic but adaptive consequence of increased absolute brain size’” (p. 26). 
Berwick and Chomsky (2016) then offer their “best estimate” for when and where language 
evolved as “likely before 80,000 years ago” in Africa between the appearance of the first 
anatomically modern humans about 200,000 years ago and the last exodus from Africa about 
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60,000 years ago. 
 　 Diller and Cann (2013) not only argue for the co-evolution of language and the brain but also 
differ sharply with Chomsky and his allies on the timeline for the evolution of the language 
faculty.  They go so far as to claim that the earliest anatomically modern  Homo sapiens more 
than 200,000 years ago had “the full capacity for language” (p. 246), and that “the first spoken 
words were used at least by the time of the emergence of the genus  Homo more than two 
million years ago” (p. 257).  Szamado and Szathmary (2012) concur that the evidence suggests co-
evolution “is not just feasible but in our opinion it is the likeliest explanation behind the current 
complexity of human brain, language, and culture” (p. 165). 
 　 Returning to the role of natural selection in the evolution of the language faculty, Berwick 
and Chomsky (2011) reprise Tattersall’s quote above and maintain that his conclusion concerning 
the lack of a role for natural selection in the appearance of language “raises no problems for 
standard evolutionary biology, contrary to illusions in popular literature” (p. 26).  Elsewhere 
(Berwick ＆ Chomsky, 2016), they quote Darwin (1859) himself: “‘Furthermore, I am convinced 
that Natural Selection has been the main but not the exclusive means of modification’.” 
 　 Berwick and Chomsky (2016, p. 33) trace the focus on natural selection to the publication of 
 Genetical Theory of Natural Selection by R. A. Fisher in 1930 in which he argues that “all 
adaptive evolutionary change is micromutational―consisting of infinitesimally small changes 
whose phenotypic effects approach zero” (p. 34).  This in turn led to the thinking that natural 
selection is the “‘sole source of creativity in evolution ... [and that] mutation on its own provides 
little or no phenotypic form’.” which Berwick and Chomsky claim is simply wrong. 
 　 As we have seen, Berwick and Chomsky (2016) offer their “best estimate” for when and 
where language evolved as “likely before 80,000 years ago” in Africa between the appearance of 
the first anatomically modern humans about 200,000 years ago and the last exodus from Africa 
about 60,000 years ago.  “That leaves us with about 130,000 years, or approximately 5,000 ― 6,000 
generations of time for evolutionary change.  This is not ‘overnight in one generation’ as some 
have (incorrectly) inferred―but neither is it on the scale of geological eons.”  On the other hand, 
it is, for example, “what Nilsson and Pelger (1994) estimated as the time required for the full 
evolution of a vertebrate eye from a single cell” (p. 157). 
 　 Further bolstering their point, Berwick and Chomsky (2016, pp. 159 ― 164) point out that 
diffusion tensor imaging has provided information about the fiber tracts that link language-
related dorsal (upper) regions of the adult human brain to the language-related ventral (lower) 
regions.  “The idea is that these dorsal and ventral fiber tracts together form a complete ‘ring’ 
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that moves information from the lexicon to the areas on the dorsal side where it is used by 
Merge.  The key idea is that this fiber-tract ‘ring’ must be in place in order that syntactic 
processing work” (p, 161).  At birth, the fiber connections to Broca’s area are missing, “as if the 
brain is not properly ‘wired up’ at birth to do syntax processing.”  However, these fiber tracts 
become linked and functional by about ages two to three, when syntactic development in the 
child becomes apparent.  On the other hand, the fiber tracts responsible for auditory processing 
are functional from birth, making it possible for a human child to acquire the sound system for 
their language(s) during the first year of life.  The corresponding fiber tract connections in the 
brains of macaque and the chimpanzee are not connected, like those of a human newborn. 
Berwick and Chomsky (2016) speculate: 
 While we cannot be certain, if it is indeed the case that human syntax requires a fully wired 
‘ring’, then the notion that some ‘small rewiring of the brain’ resulted in a fully working 
syntax system with Merge might not be so far off the mark.  A small genomic change in a 
growth factor for one of the fibers, along with proper fiber tract guidance, might suffice, and 
there’s certainly enough time for it .... a small neural change of this type could lead to large 
phenotypic consequences―without much evolution required, and not all that much time. (p. 
164) 
 Chomsky (2016) refers to this as providing “the basis for unbounded and creative thought, the 
‘great leap forward’ revealed in the archaeological record, and the remarkable differences 
separating modern humans from their predecessors and the rest of the animal kingdom” (p. 25). 
　 Nevertheless, in the debate over the evolution of the human language capacity, Chomsky’s, as 
well as Berwick and Chomsky’s, definitive conclusion against a role for natural selection is 
particularly controversial.  Even Anderson (2013), who accepts such fundamental Chomskyan 
ideas as Universal Grammar and I-language, nevertheless asserts that the language faculty 
“probably arose through natural selection” (p. 32) and cites Pinker and Bloom (1990) in support 
of this conclusion (p. 21).  Indeed, in a series of responses to Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002) 
and counter-responses, Pinker and Jackendoff (2005) are critical of hypotheses that question “a 
more conventional evolutionary vision of language”; namely, that “the language faculty evolved 
gradually in response to the adaptive value of more precise and efficient communication in a 
knowledge-using, socially interdependent lifestyle” (223).  They reinforce their argument by 
citing recent findings concerning the FOXP2 gene that “support the notion that language 
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evolved piecemeal in the human lineage under the influence of natural selection, with the 
selected genes having pleiotropic effects that incrementally improved multiple components” (p. 
218).  Fitch, Hauser, and Chomsky (2005) respond by dismissing the data on FOXP2 as 
“irrelevant” (p. 190) to their hypothesis that FLB (faculty of language―broad sense) is shared 
with nonhuman animals and what is unique to humans is FLN (faculty of language―narrow 
sense), which consists of the computational mechanism of recursion and “is recently evolved” 
(Hauser et al., 2002, p. 1573).  Fitch et al. (2005) point out that the FOXP2 gene is found in all 
mammals and is, therefore, “a candidate for inclusion in FLB but  not in FLN” (p. 190).  Jackendoff 
and Pinker (2005) respond to this claim by countering, “This is one feature which we  know is 
uniquely human .... the gene belongs to a  family [italics in original] of similar genes found in other 
mammals, but its exact sequence is uniquely human” (p. 215).  They concede “we can not [ sic ] be 
certain whether the human version of the gene was selected for language per se or for orofacial 
praxis.  But the alternatives are empirically distinguishable, and the former seems far more 
likely” (pp. 215 ― 16).  While Pinker and Jackendoff and Jackendoff and Pinker accept the utility of 
the FLB/FLN distinction, they differ in important respects from Chomsky and his colleagues on 
the details, as the controversy over the FOXP2 gene illustrates.
 　 Thus, while Chomsky and his critics both emphasize the biological basis of the language 
capacity, they markedly differ in particulars, another being the role of evolution through natural 
selection and our inability to understand the entirety of the universe.  The Chomskyan view 
questions the role of natural selection rather than evolution itself.  Berwick and Chomsky (2016) 
refer to “the confusion between evolution and natural selection―a factor in evolution, as Darwin 
stressed, but not  the factor” (p. 105).  Chomsky has recently (2016) referred to “dropping the 
untenable recourse to natural selection.” By doing so “we are left with a serious and challenging 
scientific inquiry: to determine the innate components of our cognitive nature in language, 
perception, concept formation, theory construction, artistic creation, and all other domains of life” 
(p. 56).  Returning to the important role of mystery, he admits, “What is inconceivable to me is 
no criterion for what can exist” (p. 33), and argues that “far from bewailing the existence of 
mysteries-for-humans, we should be extremely grateful for it” (p. 56).  He goes on to suggest that 
an additional task is “to determine the scope and limits of human understanding, while 
recognizing that some differently structured intelligence might regard human mysteries as 
simple problems and wonder that we cannot find the answers, much as we can observe the 
inability of rats to run prime number mazes because of the very design of their cognitive 
nature.” Furthermore, “... the theory of evolution places humans firmly within the natural world, 
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taking humans to be biological organisms much like others, hence the capacities that have scope 
and limits, including the cognitive domain.  Those who accept modern biology should therefore 
be mysterians” (p. 56). 
 Conclusion 
 　 Viewing the evolution of the human language faculty from a broad perspective, Hauser et al. 
(2002) “firmly believe that a broad diversity of methods and perspectives will ultimately provide 
the richest answers to the problem of language evolution” (p. 1574).  They emphasize the 
benefits of comparative studies of humans and other animals to get at what is shared with other 
animals in terms of adaptations for speech, communication, perception, and a number of other 
cognitive areas and what is truly unique about the human faculty for language. 
 　 Addressing the disagreements between the Chomskyan biological approach and the social/
communication approach, Sinha (2014) argues that “social and biological explanatory frames” (p. 
31) do not have to remain opposed to each other.  He sees a possible role in the evolution of 
language for both positions: “Succinctly stated, neither genes nor culture, singly, can account for 
what, if anything, makes humans different from other species ....  What is needed, it seems, is a 
theoretical apparatus capable of integrating culture and biology” (p. 32). 
 　 Nevertheless, Sinha’s is a social origins approach to language.  He implicitly rejects Chomsky’s 
approach when he claims that human culture is distinguished from non-human species “by the 
predominant place occupied in it by language as a biocultural niche” (p 37) and this biocultural 
niche treatment of language no longer requires “the organism to possess an innate Universal 
Grammar to account for language acquisition” (p. 38). 
 　 Indeed, considering the lack of evidence and the thousands, perhaps millions of years of the 
existence of language, rather than any definitive answers on its nature and its origins, 
speculation seems to be the best that can be hoped for at present.  As with any number of other 
scientific inquiries, speculation about the nature and origin of language is undertaken from a 
multiplicity of theoretical and philosophical perspectives.  By emphasizing I-language, Chomsky’s 
sphere for speculation is the human mind, about which as little is known for certain as about the 
nature and origins of language.  By downplaying E-language, about which much more can be 
and is known, Chomsky’s concept of language appears to be incomplete to his critics.  On the 
other hand, it could also be argued that by downplaying the role of the mind in language, in the 
sense Chomsky conceives of it, his critics also fail to see language in its totality.  As we have 
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seen, some of his critics decisively dismiss central concepts of Chomskyan linguistics, such as 
Universal Grammar.  On the other hand, by acknowledging that there is also E-language (the 
social and communicative aspect of language) Chomsky seems far more generous than his 
critics. 
 　 Perhaps the human language capacity is simply too large an entity to conceptualize in its 
totality.  Yet, both the idealist/rationalist and materialist/empiricist approaches have strengths 
and weaknesses.  As Sinha (2014) proposes, a true synthesis of these often opposing positions 
would go a long way towards increasing our understanding of this vital human ability and of 
who we are as humans.  However, the dismissal of the Chomskyan approach from the discourse 
on a “theoretical apparatus capable of integrating culture and biology” (Sinha, 2014, p. 32) misses 
the mark and impoverishes the search for the nature and evolution of the human language 
faculty.  As Chomsky (2016) reminds us: “Willingness to be puzzled is a valuable trait to 
cultivate, from childhood to advanced inquiry” (p. 10). 
 Notes 
 1 . Chomsky cautions that “we should first be clear about what it is that has evolved.  It is, of 
course, not languages but rather the capacity for language―that is, UG.  Languages change, but 
they do not evolve” (Berwick ＆ Chomsky, 2016, pp. 91 ― 92).  While himself using “the 
conventional term ‘evolution of language’,” Chomsky warns that it “can be and sometimes is 
misleading” (p. 92).
2 .  Hauser et al. (2002) clarify: “Roughly speaking, we can think of a particular human language as 
consisting of words and computational procedures (‘rules’) for constructing expressions from 
them.  The computational system has the recursive property ... to recombine meaningful units 
into an unlimited variety of larger structures, each differing systematically in meaning” (p. 1576). 
3 .  Larson et.al. (2010) explain that “a recursive rule is one that yields self-embedded structures” (p, 
7).  Berwick and Chomsky (2016) further explain that “language is therefore based on a recursive 
generative procedure that takes elementary word-like elements from some store, call it the 
lexicon, and applies repreatedly to yield structured expressions without bound” (p. 66) and that 
“optimally, recursion can be reduced to Merge” (p. 71). 
 4 .  For their part, Berwick and Chomsky (2016, pp. 33 ― 34) counter that Dor and his allies rely on 
an outdated conception of evolution. 
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 言語機能の本質と起源に関する対立見解 
 ―チョムスキーと反チョムスキーの見解に焦点に合わせて― 
 バーガー・デービッド 
 抄　　録 
 　近代言語学はノーム・チョムスキーの唯心論や合理主義という哲学的伝統に沿った言語理論の強
い影響を受けている。つまり，言語は生物的資質であり，普遍文法の産物で心の所有物として本質
的には思考のためのものである。一方，唯物論や経験主義見解では言語は社会現象で主にコミュニ
ケーションのためのものである。近年は言語機能の進化という問題が多くの注目を集めてきた。チョ
ムスキーの見解では，言語機能は最近の進化的発生で，小さな突然変異の結果として出現したと言
われている。唯物論や経験主義見解では，言語機能は文化の産物として，またコミュニケーション
をより効果的にするために自然淘汰によって徐々に進化してきた。 
 キーワード：言語機能，チョムスキーの唯心論・合理主義，生物言語学，I- 言語，自然淘汰 
 
